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there were unchangeable ideals which had a more stable foundation than
the shifting sands of public opinion.48
Contemporary legal scholars such as Mortimer Adler, 49 Harold Mc-
Kinnon, ° Ben Palmer 5 and Clarence Manion 52 have expressed belief in
ultimate truth. They are the foremost advocates of the only contemporary
school of jurisprudence which is founded upon a belief in absolutes. This
philosophy is generally referred to as Natural Law.53
It will be seen that competent authority exists for maintaining that
morality is an unchanging, absolute, ascertainable standard of conduct. If
such a rule were to be applied to concrete cases, would the maze of con-
tradictory decisions in this field disappear? No one can say for sure. If a
constitutional phrase like "freedom of speech" is subject to so much doubt
and dispute, it cannot be hoped that a God-given directive to do good and
avoid evil54 will cause any less consternation. Nevertheless, such broad
standards are at least a foothold55 upon which men of intelligence and
goodwill can build a reasonably stable body of law.
EXTENSION OF LIABILITY OF STOREKEEPERS TO
THOSE RIGHTFULLY UPON THE PREMISES
Sometimes when examining a rule of law which has remained stable for a
number of years one finds that, although the rule has remained the same
in its expression, a change has occurred in it application. Such a change
seems to have taken place in the cases dealing with the liability of store-
keepers and proprietors of shops to those rightfully upon their premises.
48 Declaration of Independence, Preamble.
40 Authority cited note 46 supra, at 65.
50 Authority cited note 2 supra.
' Palmer, Reply to Mr. Charles W. Briggs, 3z A.B.A.J. 635 (1946).
52 Manion, The Founding Fathers and the Natural Law: A Study of the Source
of Our Legal Institutions, 35 A.B.A.J. 461 (1949).
3 'ln the beginning God, acting with Supreme Intelligence, created all things
according to a Divine Plan. That Plan is the Eternal Law. Man, endowed by his
Creator with an immortal soul, an intellect and a free will, can ascertain the primary
dictates of the Eternal Law by his own reason, apart from direct Revelation. Such
dictates thus made known, together with the inferences flowing rationally from them,
constitute the Natural Law." 3 Natural Law Institute (1949).
54 Authority cited note 46 supra, at 71.
55 The problem of deciding just what the moral law prohibits is not too great an
obstacle. Authority cited note 51 supra, at 636; Wilkin, Natural Law in American
Jurisprudence, 224 Notre Dame Lawyer 343, 361 (1949). Already tax statutes have
been examined in the light of Natural Law. Peters, Tax Law and Natural Law,
26 Notre Dame Lawyer 29 (195o). Other perplexing problems have been treated
also. Rommen. The Natural Law, c. XII (1948); Cobban, The Crisis of Civilization,
c. X (1941); Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law (1947); Sterilization,
33 Marq. I.. Rev. 78 (1949); Euthanasia, 33 Marq. L. Rev. 133 ('949); Divorce,
32 Marq. L. Rev. 295 ('949).
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When Mr. Jones, the storekeeper, opens his shop in the morning there
is the possibility that many different types of people might enter during
the day. Mrs. Adams, a customer, might enter with her small child, Jimmie.
Mr. Black might come in to "shop around." Others might enter to take a
shortcut, to accompany a customer, to use a telephone or to use a sanitary
facility. There is always the possibility that some unsafe condition on the
premises caused by Jones' negligence or that of his employees may result
in injury to any one of these people. Mr. Jones may well wonder, "What
are my chances of liability if one of these persons is injured? Am I liable
to every one of them?"
The rule is simple-Mr. Jones is liable for ordinary negligence to those
to whom he owes a duty of ordinary care. If the person injured is a li-
censee no such duty is owed; if he is an invitee there is such a duty.
It is well settled that Mrs. Adams, the customer, is an invitee' as long
as she remains in the part of the store serving customers.2 Proprietors of
stores,3 restaurants, 4 filling stations,5 and any other type of business open
to the public recognize this liability as a matter of course. The same holds
true of Mr. Black, the prospective customer who is just "looking around."6
The difficulty arises in the other situations mentioned, and it is in trying
to fit these people into the proper category that we find a significant change
in the attitude of the courts. People who at one time would have been con-
sidered mere licensees are increasingly recovering for their personal injuries
as invitees.
The early view appears to have been that only those who actually had
some business on the premises-that is, purchasing or negotiating-were in-
vitees. An early New York decision 7 held a man crossing defendant's prem-
ises merely for his own convenience in reaching another place to be simply
a licensee. The case gives no reasons for its holding but has been quoted
to show that one taking a shortcut across business premises is not a business
visitor.8
1 Cases are collected in Prosser, Torts 635-6 (194).
2 The limitation on premises used brings up the "area of invitation" limitation
found in Rest., Torts § 343, Comment b (1934). By its application, those on the
premises, even invitees, are mere licensees when they go upon portions not normally
open to the public. Although the scope of this note is primarily concerned with the
effect of the purpose of the plaintiff in entering the premises in the first place, it will
be necessary to refer to the "area of invitation" limitation several times in passing.
3 Dudley v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 64 Wyo. 357, 192 P. 2d 617 (1948).
4 Noack v. Wosslick, 182 Ill. App. 425 (1913).
5 Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson, 117 F. 2d 41, (C.A. 5th, 1941).
6Thompson v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 48 Cal. App. 723, 120 P. 2d 693 (i941); Meyer v.
Manzer, 179 N.Y. Misc. 355, 39 N.Y.S. zd 5 (S. Ct., Oneida County, 1943).
7Rosenthal v. United Dressed Beef Co., 52 N.Y. Misc. 166, To N.Y. Supp. 532 (S.
Ct., 19o6).
8 45 C.J., Negligence 5 194 (19z8).
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At one time a child in a store with his mother was not considered a busi-
ness visitor even though the mother was in the store to make a purchase.9
The theory was that the child had no existing intention to trade. A store-
keeper was held not liable to a friend accompanying a customer because it
"cannot be said they [merchants] invite the entrance of those who accom-
pany them [customers] but who had no intention to purchase." 10
Another early case held that a man entering a tavern for the sole purpose
of using a washroom was a licensee and remained one even though friends
already in the place treated him to drinks before his injuries."
The rule to be inferred from these early cases is that a storekeeper owed
a duty of ordinary care only to those on the premises to buy. A person
Was a mere licensee unless some monetary profit to the storekeeper did or
would directly result from his presence.
In 1934 the Restatement of Torts appeared. It kept the old forms and
made "business dealings" the test.'2 In its comments and illustrations, how-
ever, it expanded the area of plaintiff recovery. For example, one taking a
shortcut across business premises and a child with his parent or nurse are
declared to be business visitors. 13 There were cases holding a more liberal
view as to recovery before the Restatement, but since its publication it has
been quoted as a justification for such liberality of recovery in an increasing
number of cases.14
In a recent case, Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, a plaintiff entering a drug
store for the purpose of using it as a shortcut with no apparent intention
to have any dealings with the proprietor was held to be an invitee.' 5 The
court quoted the Restatement at length, using the possible benefit theory
as the basis of its decision,' 6 and as a secondary grounds the theory of an
implied invitation to members of the public to use the premises.' 7 This is a
far cry from the original view that the injured person must be one from
whom direct economic benefit could be expected.
The Restatement view that "a child taken by a mother or nurse to a shop
is a business visitor irrespective of whether it is necessary for the customer
9 Petree v. Davison-Paxon-Stokes Co., 3o Ga. App. 490, 118 S.E. 697 (1923).
10 Fleckenstein v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 91 N.J.L. 145, ioz Atl. 700
(1917).
11 Kneiser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co., 22 Cal. App. 205, 133 Pac. 989 (1913).
12 Rest., Torts § 332 (1934).
13 Rest., Torts § 332, Comments c and d (1934).
14 E.g., Weinberg v. Hartman, 65 A. zd 805 (Del, 1949); Hartman v. Miller, 143 Pa.
Super. 143, 17 A. 2d 652 (1941); Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 137 Tex. 220, 152 S.W.
2d 1073 (94).
15 235 S.W. 2d 6o9 (Tex., 1950). But see Brosnan v. Kaufman, 294 Mass. 495, 2 N.E.
zd 441 (1936); Baird v. Goldberg, 283 Ky. 558, 142 S.W. zd 120 (194o).
16 Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W. 2d 6o9, 616-7 (Tex., 1950).
37 Ibid., at 617.
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to take the child with her in order to visit the shop," s18 is in accord with
the weight of authority. Reasons for the holding vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.19
Courts today have generally reached the same conclusion in situations
involving those accompanying customers. In a 1928 Missouri case a plaintiff
who accompanied his superior onto business premises recovered because
"he might become interested in a salvaged automobile or some other attrac-
tive article. 20
The extension of the proprietor's liability has been irregular in the case
of those entering the premises for the express purpose of using the wash-
room. If the person is already a customer and uses a washroom provided
for customers, there is no doubt about his status as an invitee.2 1 If he is not
a customer, or if the washroom is in a private part of the premises, diffi-
culties arise. In Low v. Ford Hopkins Co.22 the plaintiff had not entered
to purchase anything, but merely to use the washroom, and the decision
was based upon this fact. It seems that the court could have reached the
same conclusion by using an "area of invitation" theory, for the lavatory
was only "occasionally used" by customers. If one looks only at the de-
cision of the court, it would seem that the possibility of purchase is just as
great, or the invitation to the public as wide as in the case of one taking a
shortcut.
Somewhat more liberally, the Supreme Court of Kansas has held 23 that a
former customer who was injured while approaching a washroom was an
invitee, although he had no intention to purchase at that time. The court
said that such persons might "become interested, for example, in a brand
of cigars on display which they may purchase then or on some future
occasion.
'24
A telephone user also poses problems, the courts applying somewhat in-
18Rest., Torts S 332, Comment d (1934).
19 Weinberg v. Hartman, 65 A. 2d 805 (Del., 1949); Custer v. Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co., 43 A. 2d 716 (Munic. Ct. App., D.C., 1945); Kremer v. Vim, 3o6 Ill. App.
476, 28 N.E. 2d 81i (i94o); L. S. Ayres and Co. v. Hicks, 22o Ind. 86, 40 N.E. 2d
334 (1942); Milliken v. Weybosset Pure Food Market, 71 R.I. 312, 44 A. 2d 723 (194).
2OKennedy v. Phillips, 319 Mo. 573, 5 S.W. 2d 33 0928). Accord: Sears Roebuck
and Co. v. Burke, 44 So. 2d 448 (Miss., 1950). The same result was reached on the
theory that the companion took the same status as the one he accompanied, Meyer v.
Manzer, 179 N.Y. Misc., 39 N.Y.S. 2d 5 (S. Ct., Oneida County, 1943); Warner v.
Lacey, 2o N.Y. Supp. 658 (App. Div., 3 d Dep't, 1923). Contra: Morse v. Sinclair
Automobile Service Corp., 86 F. 2d 298 (C.A. 5 th, 1936).
21 Sheridan v. Ravn, 91 Cal. App. 2d 179, 204 P. 2d 644 (1949); Bass v. Hunt, t5i Kan.
740, oo P. 2d 696 (1940); Main v. Lehman, 295 Mo. 174, 243 S.W. 91 (1922).
22 231 Iowa 251, 1 N.W. ad 95 (1941). (Recovery denied.)
2
3 Campbell v. Weathers, 153 Kan. 316, iz1 P. 2d 72 (94).
24 Ibid., at 321 and 76.
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consistent theories. If the telephone is a public one liability results. 25 In the
case of a semi-private telephone we again become involved in the "area of
invitation" concept, with its limitation upon use of the non-public portions
of the premises.
A plaintiff who, after making purchases, had reached the door leading
out of the store, and then returned to use a telephone has been denied re-
covery because the transaction involved was not "connected in any way
with the defendant. '20 The case is vague as to the accessibility of the tele-
phone to the public, and it would seem that the court might well have
arrived at the same result by using an "area of invitation" theory.
At least two telephone cases have held that an express statement that the
plaintiff could use the telephone should be interpreted as an express invi-
tation and have the result of imposing a higher degree of liability.27 This
contrasts with most other situations, such as those involving washrooms,
in which such statements to the plaintiff are usually looked upon as mere
permission, not affecting the liability of the proprietor. 28
The courts have, then, extended liability when the plaintiff was in the
public portion of the premises. One walking through the store or accom-
panying another has been protected. The "area of limitation" theory still
limits liability when a customer is upon the private or semi-private part of
the premises. In several cases where this limitation might have been appro-
priate the courts have seen fit to ignore it and to decide the case purely
upon the basis of purpose in entering. Express statements of permission,
except in a few telephone cases, seem to bear little weight.
The test of "business dealings," once strictly construed, is still used as the
main test of liability in the majority of cases. 29 It has been altered, though,
until almost anyone upon the public part of the premises might be said to be
a source of "potential economic benefit" to the storekeeper, thus extending
liability beyond that found in the early cases, where essentially the same
language may be found.
Perhaps the best indication of the trend is a recent Louisiana case, 0 not
strictly dealing with storekeepers and customers, yet helpful in the in-
25 Dowling v. MacLean Drug Co., 248 11. App. 270 (1928); Haley v. Deer, 135 Neb.
459, 282 N.WV. 389 (1938).
26 XVesbrock v. Colby, 315 I. App. 494, 497, 43 N.E. zd 405, 406 (1942).
2 7 Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 At. 5o2 (1931); Sulhoff v. Everett, 235 Iowa
396, 16 N.W. 2d 737 (1944) overruling McMullen v. M and N Co., 227 Iowa io6i,
29o NV. 3 (1940) which had been decided on an "area of invitation" theory without
regard to any express invitation.
28 Kneiser v. Bclasco-Blackwood Co., 2 Cal. App. 205, 133 Pac. 989 (1913); Jones v.
.o North Vacker Drive Corp., 332 I11. App. 383, 75 N.E. zd 420 ('947); MacNamara
v. MacLean, 302 Mass. 428, 19 N.E. zd 544 (1939).
2 E.g., McSray v. Citizen's National Trust and Savings Bank, 5 Cal. App. 2d 595,
43 P. zd 560 (19 35 ); Todd v. S. S. Kresge Co., 303 Ill. App. 89, 24 N.E. 2d 899 (1939).
3o Mercer v. Tremont and G. R. Co., 19 So. 2d 270 (La. App., 1944).
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terpretation of "mutual economic benefit." A boy was in a roundhouse
for the purpose of soliciting advertisements for a local paper from the
superintendent (who had no authority to order such ads). His presence
was not requested, there was no history of past dealings, and he was in-
jured before accomplishing his purpose. The court held that he was an
invitee saying, "[He] was engaged upon the course of a legitimate busi-
ness venture which unquestionably promised benefit to himself and which
held out at least potential benefit to defendant company."-"
One of the underlying reasons for the apparent extension of liability in
"invitee cases" well may be that the storekeeper actually did or did not do
something which caused the damage and that it is only a matter of chance
that the one injured (who was rightfully upon the premises) happened
to be a non-customer. The storekeeper also seems to be in a better position
to protect himself against the disastrous results of such injuries.
Although in close cases the courts talk about economic benefit and busi-
ness dealings, the recent decisions would seem to be more properly based
on what is often given as a secondary basis for liability; that is, an implied
public invitation to enter for certain purposes, not necessarily tied up di-
rectly with profit to the storekeeper. 3 2 This is the theory advocated by
Professor Prosser,33 which we have seen used as a supplementary basis for
liability in the Renfro case 3 4 and used by an increasing number of courts
in the same way.3 5 Although the practical results in terms of liability are
usually the same under either theory it would seem that the theory of im-
plied invitation is a more realistic approach to the problem.
CREATION AND EXISTENCE OF JOINT TENANCIES IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY-A STUDY OF
FORMALITIES AND INTENT
The creation of joint interests in personal property has become a need-
lessly complicated procedure. Although the intention of the parties may
clearly be to create joint interests with the right of survivorship, too fre-
quently the desired result is not attained because of an unwitting failure
to comply with historical legal formalities. It is further complicated by the
tendency of the courts to apply real property principles rather automati-
cally to personal property problems.
Originally the courts favored the centralization of titles and encouraged
31 Ibid., at 276.
82 Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W. zd 6o9, 617 (Tex., 1950); Campbell v.
Weathers, 153 Kan. 316, i1 P. 2d 72, 76 (1941).
33 Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 6oz (1942).
84 Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W. 2d 6o9, 617 (Tex., 1950).
35 Cases cited note 32, supra.
